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Abstract
Purpose: The means for enhancing the image
and business legitimacy of a socially discredited
industry—pawnbroking in pre-1949 China—are
explored. Previous studies suggest companies
operating within such industries cannot solely rely
on hard marketing strategies “to maximize sales
and profits as they do with soaps and shoes”
(Davidson, 2003, p.7). Instead, they must find soft
strategies for improving company and industry
image and legitimacy.
Design/methodology/approach: This research
relies on qualitative analysis of historical data and
documents.
Findings: Soft strategies deployed by Chinese
pawnbrokers—such as interpretations, moral
value advocacies, and institutionalized arrangements—contributed substantially to improving
pawnbroking’s image and business legitimacy.
Research
limitations/implications:
Interconnections among ethical values, image, business
legitimacy, and select marketing strategies are
clarified. The efficacy of historically analyzing
previously implemented business strategies and
their embedding contexts is discussed.
Practice implications: Strategies Chinese
pawnbrokers used to mitigate their previously
negative image and boost their business
legitimacy suggest strategies current socially
disapproved companies can use to improve their
image and business legitimacy.
Originality/value: An historical analysis of pre1949 Chinese pawnbroking can suggest soft
marketing strategies for overcoming consumers’
negative company and industry impressions.
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Introduction
Pawnshops have been denounced worldwide as
exploiters of the impecunious and intensifiers of
social pauperism (Bouman and Houtman, 1988;
Caskey, 1996; Skully, 1994). In pre-1949 China,
many Chinese believed pawnshops were unfair,
greedy, morally suspect, and malicious—a
negative image generalized to pawnbrokers and
their employees. Hence, these shops were easy
prey for looting, gauging, and haphazard taxation
during socially tumultuous times (Chang and
Qian, 1995; Liu, 2016; Qu, 2007; Sun, 1999;
Wang, 1964).
Despite their tainted reputation, Chinese
pawnshops thrived until they were banned by the
communist government in the early 1950s
(Huang, 2006; Peng, 1958; Sun, 1999; Wang,
1964; Zhang, 2008). The received economic
explanation for their prior success was the precommunist penny economy (Bouman and
Houtman, 1988), meaning typical, financially
subsistent Chinese households’ survival—given
the dearth of well-paying jobs—often depended
on immediate access to additional funds. Thus,
demand for pawnshop loans was substantial.
An economy replete with bankrupt small business
owners, low-waged workers, and peasants could
sustain a thriving pawnshop industry. However,
this industry also catered to big business owners,
landlords, and government officials (Chang and
Qian, 1995; Liu, 2016; Qu, 2007; Sun, 1999;
Wang, 1964), which inspires many questions.
Why would wealthy and high-status people
patronize pawnshops? What business-related
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attitudes characterized pawnshop owners,
investors, managers, and employees? What
factors shaped the public’s industry evaluation?
How could the industry improve its image?
Answers to such questions relate to the industry’s
nature, operation, strategies, and social meaning.
The goal for this historical analysis of pre-1949
Chinese pawnbroking is to answer the aforementioned and related questions by examining
the soft marketing strategies that improved
pawnbroking’s image and business legitimacy.
Relying on only hard strategies—such as
improving product qualities or reducing selling
price—may be insufficient; instead, soft
strategies—such as conforming to extant societal
values, altering those values, or associating with
apparently legitimate organizations (Epstein and
Votaw, 1978)—can be adopted. Hence,
economic, social, and moral rationales underlying
Chinese brokers’ effort are explored and
marketing strategies for revamping the
pawnbroking industry’s image are highlighted.
Although historical analysis provides cases for
examining and testing theories (Mahoney and
Rueschemeyer, 2003), learning from history is
not merely an epistemological benefit; for
example, past business strategies may suggest
solutions to current business dilemmas. By
tracing the roots and processes of phenomena
that shaped past marketing strategies, historical
analysis can augment current strategic
repertoires. Of course, marked differences in
historical
versus
contemporary
contexts
generally preclude unaltered application of past
strategies to current problems. Nonetheless,
intensive exploration of past marketing strategies
remains a potentially useful scholarly exercise.
The Figure depicts context and marketing
strategy duos classifiable in accord with a 2x2
grid formed from the analogues ‘Bottles’ (i.e.,
context) and ‘Wines’ (i.e., marketing strategy).
When historical and contemporary contexts are
similar—S1, pure historical analysis—companies
may thrive by adopting past marketing strategies
‘as is’. However, hindsight may suggest
alternative strategies would outperform past
strategies—S3, counterfactual analysis—which
reflects the openness and flexibility of historical
understanding. Using hindsight analysis to
answer what if questions allows current
marketers, who generally have more information
and other resources than their historical

counterparts, to design better strategies for
solving problems in historically similar contexts.
Conversely,
investigating past marketing
strategies can suggest improved strategies when
contexts differ—S2, practice-oriented analysis,
and S4, different research domains analysis.
Under S2, the mechanisms, forces, and
processes that drive strategies transcend
contexts, so prior strategy adaptations may prove
workable. Under S4, the contexts have changed
markedly and new strategies should be adopted.
-----Insert Figure here----Historical analysis of pre-1949 Chinese pawnbroking includes marketing strategies and their
contexts. A S1 approach would show the efficacy
of these strategies in pre-1949 China. A S2
approach would offer insights into contemporary
pawnbroking, which in 1987 regained its legality
in China (Li, 2002; Qu, 2007). A S3 approach
demands counterfactual understanding of past
strategies (e.g., If pre-1949 Chinese pawnshops
adopted certain strategies, would alternative
strategies have worked better?). A S4 approach
might suggest pre-1949 pawnbroking strategies
do not pertain to contemporary pawnbroking and
other industries due to contextual differences;
hence, new strategies are required. Neither a S3
nor S4 approach is taken here. By focusing on S1
and S2 approaches, the historical meanings and
contemporary
implications
of
marketing
strategies adopted by the pre-1949 Chinese
pawnbroking industry are revealed.
The exposition proceeds as follows. After introducing the characteristics of pre-1949 Chinese
pawnbroking that shaped its image, the industry’s
business legitimacy and ethicality are detailed.
Next, the social constraints, external criticisms,
and internal defenses of Chinese pawnshops are
discussed. Then, the strategies, interpretations,
and institutional arrangements adopted by
pawnshops to enhance their image and business
legitimacy are illustrated. Finally, managerial and
scholarly implications are suggested.
Pawnbroking in Pre-1949 China
Pre-1949 Chinese pawnshops operated in
metropolitan areas and small towns. In rural
areas, some shops established subsidiaries or
assigned agents to serve patrons. Geographic
location and ties (Di Yuan) are important in China
due to dialect, life habits, and values similarities.
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Most shops were managed by pawnbrokers from
two regions: Shanxi province and the Huizhou
area in Anhui province.
These two pawnbroker groups embraced similar
business strategies and practices. Their shops
ranged from small local-based shops to large
nationwide shops. They both adopted professional rules and codes; for example, Shanxi
pawnbrokers developed a codebook for pawnbroking (Dang Zi Pu), whereas Huizhou
pawnbrokers used the One Thousand Words
(Qian Zi Wen), a textbook for children, as a
codebook (Huang, 1983; Liu, 1983; Wang, 1964).
For rural peasants, both groups followed a
seasonal cycle, with money lent in spring paid
back (with interests and fees) in fall, after
peasants sold their harvested products (Liu,
1983; Sun, 1999; Wang, 1964). To stabilize their
business environment, both groups ensured
fruitful relationships with government officials.
Political elites such as Yan Xishan, Wang
Zhanyuan, Zhang Xun, and Cao Kun controlled,
invested in, or sponsored many Shanxi
pawnshops (Wang, 1964), whereas government
leaders such as Li Hongzhang and Wu Tingfang
supported Huizhou pawnshops (Liu, 1983; Sun,
1999). Finally, both groups sought business
diversification, with many shops investing in real
estate, Qian Zhuang (the old-styled Chinese
bank), restaurants, and used goods stores
(Chang and Qian, 1995; Liu, 1995: Qu, 2007).
However, the two groups differed in several
regards. Although they operated across China
(Chang and Qian, 1995), Shanxi shops
dominated the north and Huizhou shops dominated the south. Demarcating northern and
southern markets streamlined pawnbroking by
encouraging region-specific professional rules
and codes. Both groups focused on different
traditional Chinese values. For example, Huizhou
pawnbrokers believed the smartest elites should
serve either in government or as Confucianism
scholars, whereas Shanxi pawnbrokers believed
these elites should become businessmen. Like
other Shanxi businessmen, Shanxi pawnbrokers
revered historical hero Guan Yu and stressed Yi
(allegiance to friends or family members),
whereas Huizhou pawnbrokers embraced Zhu Xi,
the main proponent of formal Confucianism
(Huang, 2006; Liu and Wang, 2002; Luo, 1979;
Qu, 2007; Wang, 1999). Huizhou pawnbrokers
tended to hire family members; in contrast,
Shanxi pawnbrokers preferred easier-to-manage

non-family members (Cai et al., 2008; Liu et al.,
2012).
Pawnshop owners and investors (Dongjia)
included major rural landlords, industrialists,
retired or incumbent officials, and gang members
(Huang, 2007; Liang, 2016; Peng, 1958; Sun,
1999; Wang, 1964). These investors or owners
(and also pawnshop patrons) were either prevention (i.e., ‘safety, security, and responsibility’)
focused or promotion (i.e., ‘hope, advancement,
and achievement’) focused (Petersen et al.,
2015, p.47). Rural landlords wanted outlets for
their agricultural surpluses and reliable economic
return; industrialist welcomed investible funds,
financial diversification, and a venue for offloading outdated goods; officials sought safe
investments; and gang members wanted fronts
for money laundering, drug dealing, or other
crimes (Sun, 1999; Wang, 1964). In addition,
investors from Belgium, Japan, Britain, Switzerland, and Russia operated some pre-1949
Chinese pawnshops (Sun 1999; Wang, 1964).
Pawnshop managers (Zhanggui)—often owners
or shareholding partners (Sun, 1999; Wang,
1964)—acquired extensive knowledge about
their profession by working as front-desk agents
(Guishang Huoji). Gradually, they gained
expertise judging the market value of loan
collateral and persuading borrowers to accept
loan terms (Wang, 1964). Successful managers
often worked for multiple pawnshops and/or
invested in other businesses, such as grocery
stores, pharmaceutical companies, banks,
restaurants, and real estate firms (Chang and
Qian, 1995; Liu, 2016; Qu, 2007; Sun, 1999;
Wang, 1964).
Pawnshops ranged from small mom-and-pop
operations (Fu Qi Dian) to conglomerates (Peng,
1958; Sun, 1999; Wang, 1964). This range
related to the adopted image-building strategy.


Larger pawnshops dominated pawnbroking associations and were more
likely to acquire a positive image.



Smaller pawnshops focused on money
acquisition
and
ignored
industry
associations.



Unlicensed pawnshops—often controlled
by gang members or local thugs—served
as fronts for criminal activities such as
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Pawnbroking in Pre-1949 China: ‘Soft Strategies’ for Overcoming a Negative Image

drug dealing or money laundering (Sun,
1999; Wang, 1964). Such pawnshops
experienced financial reversals when the
Chinese government stiffened regulations (e.g., stricter background check
required for license approval and more
detailed auditing of transactions).
Like pawnshop patrons worldwide, Chinese
borrowers pledged various items—such as
clothes, gold watches, silverware, furniture,
jewelry, agricultural products, antiques, artwork,
and real estate—as loan collateral (Chang and
Qian, 1995; Feng, 2017; Sun, 1999; Wang,
1964). Pawnbrokers alone assessed the economic value of these items. Borrowers had no legal
or moral obligation to return the loans, with
pawnshops acquiring the property rights of
collateral when loans (plus interests and fees)
remained outstanding after a typical one-day-to18-month maturity date (Peng, 1958; Sun, 1999;
Wang, 1964).
In addition to impoverished workers and
peasants, pawnshop patrons (Diandang Kehu or
Dang Hu) included rich businessmen, gamblers,
prostitutes, and professional criminals affiliated
with the Green Gang (Qing Bang) or Triad (Sanhe
Hui). Businessmen, for example, used pawnshops for temporary agricultural product storage
(Sun, 1999) or quick monetary assistance to
make discretionary purchases (Chang and Qian,
1995; Wang, 1964).
Pawnbroking’s Business Legitimacy and
Ethicality
In addition to sufficient profitability, business
survival requires social, political, and cultural
approval (i.e., business legitimacy, which
embodies “congruence between the operations
of a firm, including the marketing of its products,
and the values of the society in which the firm
conducts its business”) (Davidson, 2003, p.2).
This legitimacy—embedded in ‘background
institutions’ (De George 1993)—may evolve with
contextual shifts (e.g., changes in personal
preferences, political norms, professional or
industrial codes, family or clan values, economic
ideologies, and national identities) (Ralston et al.,
1995; Srnka, 2004).
Because the viewpoints, preferences, and
interests of stakeholders often differ (Martin,
2002;
Walker,
2010),
inter-stakeholder

discourses can reveal the shared basis for a
society’s ethical values (Green and Donovan,
2010). Similarly, a full assessment of Chinese
pawnbroking should consider the weltanschauung of all stakeholders.
Ethical judgments in pre-1949 China fall into two
subsets: internal-oriented and external-oriented.
Internal-oriented relates to whether a company’s
owner offered assistance to family members,
relatives, and friends (Huang, 2007; Peng, 1958).
Although possible, this standard need not violate
mainstream ethical values. In contrast, externaloriented relates to evaluating acquaintances’ and
strangers’ behaviors. Although relying on
society’s shared ethical values, this orientation
may be more stringent when applied to distant
relationships (Fukuyama, 1995).
Evaluation of Chinese pawnbroking by pawnbrokers is internal-oriented, whereas its evaluation by other people is external-oriented.
Because their bases differ, these two evaluation
subsets can diverge yet partially explain why
Chinese businessmen often formed or consolidated businesses based on kinship, family
ties, or geography-centered clans (Cochran,
2000; Goodman, 1995; Huang, 2007; Peng,
1958).
Social Constraints, External Criticisms, and
Internal Defenses
Various social constraints shape a company’s
personality (Bowie, 2010) and yield an ethical or
unethical culture (Davidson, 2003). Companies
offering socially unwelcomed goods or services
face two types of social constraints: “those
imposed informally by various social groups that
can evolve into customs or codes…[and those]
imposed by law and regulation” (Davidson, 2003,
p.178). Social constraints create diverse benchmarks for social criticism, as ethical responsibility
in business is assessed at individual,
organizational, and societal levels (Brenkert,
2008; Goodpaster, 2010).
Attitudes toward a company generally depend on
evaluations across three dimensions: the offered
products’ nature, corporate culture, and strategic
responses. For example, customers may
complain about low product quality, problematic
marketing (e.g., ads with incomplete or incorrect
claims), lack of personal integrity among
employees, or troubling business style (e.g.,
4|Page
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questionable corporate values, strategies, and
behaviors). In response, companies may revamp
their product, ensure ethical marketing practices
consistent with a positive image, or embrace
salubrious values, strategies, and behaviors.
These options imply marketing strategies likely
differ between companies selling socially
acceptable
versus
socially
unacceptable
products (Davidson, 2003).
Pre-1949 Chinese society generally viewed
pawnbrokers and the pawnbroking industry
negatively. Pawnshops were regarded as less
reputable than other businesses, with pawnbrokers viewed as unsavory characters who
perpetrated undesirable values and commercial
strategies. Such criticisms pressured pawnbrokers to enhance their industry’s image and
business legitimacy.
The mechanism driving image building followed
these links: social valuespeople’s industry
beliefspawnbrokers’
responsesenhanced
image and business legitimacybetter industry
performance. As industry legitimizers and
meaning makers (McCracken, 2005), pawnbrokers bridged the gap between people’s social
needs and pawnbrokers’ interests. Their efforts
reshaped the multi-level attitudes about pawnbroking that led to its wider acceptance.
Many Chinese denigrated pawnbrokers as
excessive profit seekers who exploited the
impoverished. In defense, pawnbrokers touted
their informal but convenient services as vital for
people lacking access to formal financial
services. For example, to offset borrower default
risk, most pawnshops limited loans to roughly
50% of the collateral’s resale value plus costs—
including processing fees and interest—which
was similar to other financial institutions
extending high-risk loans (Peng, 1958; Sun,
1999; Wang, 1964).
To create a good corporate citizen image (Smith,
1994), pawnbrokers touted their business was
legal and assisted local communities via
donations to schools, hospitals, fire stations, and
poorhouses. Similar to modern companies’ use of
philanthropy and corporate social responsibility to
maintain a positive image (Gautier and Pache,
2015; Kanter, 1999), pawnbrokers established
cordial relationships with everyone from top
government officials to peasants. Positive
personal image building by pawnbrokers—who

insisted they were moral equals to other
businessmen—contributed to improved attitudes
about pawnshops. Chinese pawnbrokers insisted
personal integrity could translate into pawnshop
integrity (Feng, 2012).
Boosting Pawnshop Legitimacy
Chinese pawnbrokers did more than passively
defend pawnshops; they also used a masquerade strategy to enhance their shop’s image
(Jensen and Roy, 2008). This strategy highlights
a product’s merits while downplaying its shortcomings by pretending it “is something different
than what it really is” (Davidson, 2003, p.123).
By insisting their loans represented a normal
economic transaction, pawnbrokers depicted
their industry as promoting ethical consumption
and ethical production. Because mainstream
financial institutions lacked economic incentives
to grant such loans, pawnbrokers defended their
shops as a necessary evil for aiding impoverished
Chinese desperate for money to support their
family or develop a small business. Hence,
pawnshops offered economic help and
convenience to borrowers while embracing the
Chinese value local friends and local
acquaintances are precious (Xiangli Xiangqin),
which fostered positive local relationships and
ensured repeat patronage. In response to
negative impressions and the social values that
underscored them, pawnbrokers redefined the
origin, function, and motivation for pawnshops.
Positive origin. Companies may use storytelling
to improve their image by shaping the ethical
situation, which contains the meanings, context,
and interpretations of business behaviors
(Brenkert, 2008, p.193). Pawnbrokers concocted
positive origin stories to ameliorate people’s
negative attitudes toward pawnshops. Similar to
Buddhist temples (Yang, 1950), where monks
extended direct grants and low-interest loans,
pawnshops offered financial aid to poor people.
This philanthropic origin story conferred business
legitimacy. Another positive origin story linked
Chinese pawnshops to Fu Shan (Wang, 1964), a
national hero who relied on pawnshops to fund
his overthrow of the despotic Qing government.
Positive function. Pawnbrokers insisted their
shops performed positive economic, social, and
ethical functions.
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Economic. Pawnbrokers hailed their
shops as grass root financial institutions
for helping poor people secure loans
conveniently (Chang and Qian, 1995;
Liu, 2016; Qu, 2007; Sun, 1999; Wang,
1964).



Social (honor the family (Guangzhong
Yaozhu)). Marketing in traditional China
boosted economic interests and familycentered goals. The successful operation
of a pawnshop increased the owner’s
and his family’s social status (Liu and
Wang, 2002). Hence, pawnbroking was a
respectable business.



Ethical.
Like
many
Chinese
businesspeople,
many
Chinese
pawnbrokers
promoted
social
responsibility by hiring family members,
relatives, friends, and other community
members (Huang, 2007; Peng, 1958;
Wu, 1984).

Build public image. Modern companies use
philanthropy and corporate social responsibility to
boost social legitimacy (Burlingame and
Frishkoff, 1996; Saiia et al., 2003; Szőcs et al.,
2016). Similarly, Chinese pawnbrokers’ actions
enhanced their industry’s image; for example,
Huizhou pawnbrokers offered low interest rates
(i.e., 1% to 2% monthly), extended grace periods
for redeeming collateral at no additional cost,
financed local educational and healthcare
institutions, donated food to famine or flood
victims, and donated money for local community
improvement (Sun, 1999; Wang, 1964; Wang,
1999; Zhang, 2008). These actions encouraged a
positive evaluation of pawnshops and a positive
long-term relationship between pawnshops and
local communities, meaning pawnbrokers
encountered less resistance and more
cooperation for investing in pawnshops or other
businesses.
Improve social image via endorsements. In
addition to close government affiliation, pawnbrokers invited famous politicians, popular actors,
widely acclaimed novelists, renowned businessmen, highly respected physicians, local gentlemen (Xiangshen), and other celebrities to
endorse pawnbroking (Chang and Qian, 1995;
Wang, 1964). These endorsements signaled that
pawnbrokers
enjoyed
good
relationships
(renyuan) with important people, implying

pawnshops and their financial services could be
trusted.
Advance socially preferred values. Through their
managers, companies as agents can exercise
moral judgments and make moral decisions
(Brenkert, 1995). Pawnbrokers did not merely
respond passively to social pressures; instead,
they reinterpreted well-entrenched social values
that drove people’s previously negative attitudes
about pawnshops. In particular, pawnbrokers
adhered to Yi (loyalty, responsibility, and social
harmony) when pursuing Li (material interests).
Adherence to this dyad somewhat conforms to
the Hunt-Vitell ethics model’s dual deontological
and teleological perspectives (Hunt, 2006; Hunt
and Vitell, 1986).
Popular conventional Chinese values were
adopted to create a preferred value mix for
Chinese pawnshops. Those values included
loyalty (Zhong), filial piety (Xiao), deference
(Jing), honesty (Chen), benevolence (Ren), trustworthiness (Xing), and personal allegiance (Yi).
For example, pawnbrokers and their employees
idolized Guan Gong (Sun, 1999), a historical
figure widely praised for his loyalty to leaders
(Zhong) and allegiance to friends (Yi)—two
elements essential to successful Chinese business. A better image also relied on adherence to
honesty (Chen). Specifically, a Chen pawnbroking transaction entailed goodwill, complete
transparency, and trustworthy information.
Advocating these social values legitimized
pawnbroking.
To boost internal identification and professional
pride, pawnbrokers—especially from Shanxi and
Huizhou—professed the pursuit of economic
prosperity via legal and moral means (followed
Da Dao) was respectable (i.e., in accord with
orthodox Confucian doctrine (1960)) and a
pawnbroking career provided an entrée to
achieving personal goals (Liu and Wang, 2002).
Huizhou pawnbrokers advocated pawnbroking
jobs as a backdoor for young people who wanted
a government job but failed the civil service exam
(Feng, 2012). Embracing a Taoist mindset
(JieMan), which entails modesty and selflessness, spurred pawnbrokers to construct a
managerial style that discouraged greed (Li,
2005). To encourage employee loyalty, pawnbrokers offered direct subsidies (Feng 2012).
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Improving Reputation Institutionally
Like many companies, Chinese pawnshops were
not passive recipients of a public image; rather,
they relied on established professional or social
institutions and practices to reshape beliefs about
their services and industry values (Marchand,
2001).
Professional associations. Pre-1949 Chinese
businessmen often relied on professional associations to extend their business legitimacy and
protect employees’ careers (Xu, 2001). These
associations hired (1) news reporters to
propagate a positive image as a legal and moral
industry, and (2) public relations people and
lawyers to deal with law enforcement entities
when stolen goods were an issue (Liu, 1995; Sun,
1999; Wang, 1964). Hence, pawnshops established associations to enhance their reputation
collectively via self-regulation (Luo, 1979; Wu,
1984).
Although such associations offered powerful
assistance, some pawnshops failed to join (1) to
avoid the membership fee, (2) to avoid unfriendly
association leaders, or (3) due to distrust of
leaders from certain Chinese regions (Sun,
1999). People generally judged unaffiliated
pawnshops as economically weaker and less
ethical (Wang, 1964).
Professional rules and codes. Pawnshop
associations adopted professional rules and
codes to regulate pawnshop and pawnbroker
behavior. These rules and codes, meant to
ensure voluntary compliance with business
conduct consistent with mainstream Chinese
moral values, were essential to indoctrinating
new industry recruits.
Pawnshops coined professional jargon and
written formulas only apprehensible to
employees (Huang, 2006; Liu, 2016; Wang,
1964; Wu, 1984). Complex jargon increased
industry entry barriers while obscuring shops and
their borrowers in a shroud of mystery, which
attracted new clientele. In addition, meanings
implied by these rules and codes advanced a
business climate essential for increasing
employee identification with the industry.
Positive image through Guanxi. Guanxi is broadly
defined as “a close and pervasive interpersonal
relationship key to buyer-seller transactions in

China” (Zhou, Hyman, and Leonhardt, 2017,
p.189). It facilitates positive outcomes by
lubricating business relationships with personal
social connections. The unique role of guanxi in
China's social and business life is well-known (Ou
et al., 2014).
Pawnbrokers relied on word-of-mouth to spread
positive evaluations. They knew (1) hostile gossip
could kill businesses situated in a culture that
maintained social stability via local community
building, and (2) positive community interactions
would facilitate investments in other businesses
because Guanxi fostered the social reciprocity
that sustained special favors and obligations (Lee
and Dawes, 2005). Guanxi helped consolidate
personal trust (Huang, 2007) and improve
community relationships (Liu et al., 2013); it
largely defined the scale, scope, and process of
business transactions (Pita et al., 1999). To
develop positive Guanxi within their local
communities, every spring Huizhou pawnbrokers
treated local gentlemen (Xiangshen) to lavish
banquets (Feng, 2012).
Pawnbrokers used local newspapers to build a
reputation for social conscience. They often
invited reporters to attend pawnshop-sponsored
charity functions. Especially during the 1930s—
when China was under increasing pressure from
Japan and nationalism became a major news
theme—pawnshops aligned with nationalistic
advocacy groups to mobilize support for antiimperialistic movements, often via local
newspaper declarations (Chang and Qian, 1995).
Government assistance or sponsorship. Unlike
modern Western lobbying as a way to protect
self-interests, pre-1949 Chinese businessmen
bribed officials charged with judging the legality
or appropriateness of business behaviors. The
context dependence of bribery morality (Velasquez, 2010) applies to Chinese pawnbrokers. In
pre-1949 China, bribes were considered ethical,
as they reduced abuses by local officials. Thus,
some Chinese eulogized bribery as a pragmatic
mechanism for protecting or extending their
business interests.
Former national presidents, provincial governors,
and top military leaders were involved directly or
indirectly in pawnbroking from the late 1910s until
1949 (Wang, 1964). Pawnshop owners often
invited retired or incumbent officials with ongoing
policy influence (through former students or
7|Page

Pawnbroking in Pre-1949 China: ‘Soft Strategies’ for Overcoming a Negative Image

subordinates) to serve as nominal managers.
These officials invested in pawnshops and
received an annual bonus. In return, they ensured
pawnshops received a preferred tax rate and
avoided legal hassles. More important in a
collective society (Hofstede, 1996), the close
affiliation with officials inspired people’s trust in
pawnshops.
Diversified investment. Many pawnshops
diversified by investing in agricultural production,
industrial manufacturing, banking services,
healthcare, and education (Huang, 2007; Li,
2002; Peng, 1958; Skully, 1994; Sun, 1999;
Wang, 1964; Wang, 1999; Zhang, 2008). This
arrangement was meant to minimize potential
economic risks and enhance beliefs about
financial stability. Diversification reinforced a
morally upstanding image for pawnbrokers; they
behaved like other Chinese pursuing business
interests (Huang, 2007) and owning a pawnshop
signified the owner’s wealth (Wang, 1964).
Good neighborhood locations. Pawnshops
located their main business or subsidiaries in
concession areas (ZuJie) managed by foreign
governments under Sino-foreign treaties implemented after the first Opium War (post-1842)
(Cochran, 1999; Spence, 1990), implying political
protection or financial assistance from foreign
sources (Wang, 1964). Receiving approval to
operate in these areas was an intangible asset
sought by many Chinese companies.
Large pawnshops would expel bad apples from
the industry. Infamous pawnshops—especially
smaller ones (Sun, 1999; Wang, 1964)—that
earned a bad reputation for higher interest rates,
shorter maturity dates, and other exploitative
terms, were expelled from the pawnbroking
association and precluded from future assistance
by other pawnshops. Self-regulation stressing
disassociation with immoral pawnshops created
a collective image of an industry with a social
conscience.
Conclusion
By relying on marketing strategies meant to
enhance their image and business legitimacy,
pre-1949 Chinese pawnshops flourished by
serving underprivileged and privileged Chinese,
whose social tastes and goals differed (Stillerman, 2015). Poor Chinese were mainly
prevention focused (i.e., pursued their security

and safety goals) and needed pawnbroking to
improve their daily lives, whereas rich Chinese
were mainly promotion focused (i.e., enhanced
their economic interests or social achievements).
Neither hard marketing strategies—such as
improving product quality or cutting price—nor
overcoming the dire economic environment in
pre-1949 China ensured their success. Instead,
soft marketing strategies—such as social value
advocacy, celebrity endorsement, and effective
storytelling—helped establish the legitimacy and
ethicality of Chinese pawnshops.
Implications for companies or industries with an
unfavorable image exist. A company’s marketing
strategy should focus on more than its financial
performance (Bharadwaj, 2015). Other worthwhile long-term marketing goals include
enhancing corporate reputation, corporate social
responsibility, and community relationship
building (Liu et al., 2013; Liu and Ko, 2014). One
moral of this pawnbroking story is a discredited
industry can improve its image and business
legitimacy through effective storytelling. Offering
customers more favorable terms can counter a
company’s historically greedy image, and
institutionalizing certain values can foster a
positive
image.
Through
self-regulation,
professional associations can maintain a positive
industry image. Advocating popular social values
can mobilize social support. Developing good
relationships with government agencies can
facilitate business transactions.
The practical implications of this research are
twofold. Certain soft strategies adopted by pre1949 Chinese pawnbrokers may help the current
Chinese pawnbroking industry, which achieved
business legitimacy when China relegalized it
during the late 1980s (S2 in Figure). Learning
from historical lessons via pure historical (S1) or
counterfactual (S3) analyses can help sidestep
mistakes in addressing similar problems. More
broadly, evaluating historical strategies (S1)
implies that deploying hard strategies is not the
only way a socially discredited industry can
enhance its image. Rather, industries can
ameliorate their socially discredited image by
deploying soft strategies. Institutionalized
arrangements—such as professional associations, professional codes and jargons, personal
Guanxi and community relationship building, and
government sponsorship—can improve the
reputation and brand equity of a socially
discredited industry.
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Figure
‘Bottles’ (Contexts) and ‘Wines’ (Marketing Strategies)
Bottles
Old

Old
Wines

New

New

S1: Old contexts and
old business strategies
(Pure historical
analysis)

S2: New contexts but old
business strategies
(Practice-oriented
analysis)

S3: Old contexts but
new business
strategies (Counterfactual analysis)

S4: New contexts and
new business strategies
(Different research
domains analysis)
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